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The 2.8 million elementary and secondary public school teachers in the United States 
make up 8.5 percent of all college-educated workers 25 to 64 years old.
1 Even though there is 
growing recognition of the contribution of these teachers to students’ educational outcomes and 
later economic success, large gaps exist in our understanding of how teacher labor markets 
function.  Most research on teacher labor markets has used models developed for the private 
sector. However, markets for public school teachers, as well as markets for many other public 
employees, differ in fundamental ways from those in the private sector.  The objective of this 
paper is to develop and estimate a model that more accurately characterizes the institutional 
features of teacher labor markets.  The approach is based on a game-theoretic two-sided 
matching model and the estimation strategy employs the method of simulated moments.  With 
this combination, we are able to estimate how factors affect the choices of individual teachers 
and hiring authorities, as well as how these choices interact to determine the equilibrium 
allocation of teachers across jobs. 
  Low-income, low-achieving and non-white students, particularly those in urban areas, 
often are taught by the least skilled teachers, a factor that likely contributes to the substantial 
gaps in academic achievement among income and racial/ethnic groups of students.  Such sorting 
of teachers across schools and districts is the result of a range of decisions made by individual 
teachers and school officials.  Inefficient hiring and district assignment may contribute to the 
disparities in teacher qualifications across schools, however teacher preferences are likely to be 
particularly influential.
2  Teachers differ fundamentally from other school resources. Unlike 
                                                 
1 Digest of Education Statistics 2002 and U.S Census Bureau Educational Attainment in the United States 2000 
Detailed Tables. 
2  Few studies have explored district-hiring practices, though Pflaum & Abramson (1990), Ballou (1996) and Ballou 
and Podgursky (1997) do provide evidence that many districts are not hiring the most qualified candidates.  Schools  
  2
textbooks, computers, and facilities, teachers have preferences about whether to teach, what to 
teach, and where to teach.  Potential teachers prefer one type of district to another; and within 
districts, they prefer one school to another.  Salaries are one job attribute that likely affects 
sorting, but non-pecuniary job characteristics, such as class size, preparation time, facilities, or 
characteristics of the student body, are important as well.
3  A large literature suggests that 
teachers respond to wages, yet research on the compensating wage differentials needed to attract 
teachers with particular attributes to schools with particular characteristics has not produced 
consistent results.
4   
The inconsistencies in the estimation of compensating differentials for teachers are not 
surprising given that the estimates have been based on hedonic wage models which maintain that 
wages adjust to equilibrate the supply and demand for worker and job attributes.  This 
assumption is unlikely to hold for public school teaching, given that salaries are set by collective 
bargaining and public decision making processes, not directly as a result of market forces.  In 
this context, some jobs may simply be “better jobs” than others, and teachers will sort into these 
jobs based on their ability to obtain offers from the hiring authorities.  
Non-price rationing in the market for public school teachers will result in complex 
interdependencies in the choices made by job candidates and employers.  In particular, a 
candidate’s willingness to accept a particular job will depend upon her own preferences as well 
                                                                                                                                                             
also vary in the political power they exert, which may lead to differences in teacher qualifications among schools 
within the same district.  Bridges (1996) found that when parents and students complained about poor teachers, the 
teachers were likely to be transferred to schools with high student transfer rates, large numbers of students receiving 
free or reduced-price lunches, and large numbers of minority students. 
3 In Texas, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (1999) found teachers moving to schools with high-achieving students and, 
in New York City, Lankford (1999) found experienced teachers moving to high-socioeconomic status schools when 
positions became available. 
4 As a group, these studies show that individuals are more likely to choose to teach when starting teacher wages are 
high relative to wages in other occupations (Baugh and Stone, 1982; Brewer, 1996; Dolton, 1990; Dolton and van 
der Klaaw, 1999; Dolton and Makepeace, 1993; Hanushek and Pace, 1995; Manski, 1987; Mont and Reece, 1996; 
Murnane, Singer & Willett, 1989; Rickman and Parker, 1990; Stinebrickner, 1998, 1999, 2000; Theobald, 1990;  
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as her “effective” choice set, i.e., the set of schools willing to hire her given their own “effective” 
alternatives.  In turn, whether employers make the candidate an offer will depend upon whether 
they prefer to employ alternative candidates who are willing to fill their positions, and so on.  We 
can analyze such an environment in a relatively straightforward manner using the standard two-
sided matching model extensively studied by game theorists (Roth and Sotomayer, 1990). The 
contributions of this paper are to clarify issues regarding the applicability of the standard hedonic 
model, to note the conceptual applicability of the game-theoretic, two-side matching model and 
to show how the underlying preferences of job candidates and employers in such a model can be 
estimated using the method of simulated moments.   
Our long-term goal is to identify policies that are effective for attracting and retaining 
teachers in low-performing or otherwise difficult-to-staff schools.  As we discuss further below, 
such identification has many difficulties, not the least of which is the endogeneity of any district-
level policy we observe.  The goal of this paper is more limited.  We introduce our model for the 
matching of teachers to schools and estimate this model with a limited set of school and teacher 
measures.  We focus on the initial match of teachers to schools in their first job both to simplify 
the first implementation of the model and because, as we discuss later, the initial match appears 
particularly important, in comparison to transfers and quits, in determining the disparities in the 
qualifications of teachers across schools.   
The following section of the paper briefly summarizes the data we employ and some key 
features of teacher labor markets.  Section III contrasts the hedonic wage approach with two 
alternative models of job match.  We outline our conceptual framework and empirical approach 
in section IV and present estimates of several models in section V.  Estimates of hedonic wage 
                                                                                                                                                             
Theobald and Gritz, 1996).  Baugh and Stone (1982), for example, find that teachers are at least as responsive to 
wages in their decision to quit teaching, as are workers in other occupations.    
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equations are reported in section VI and simulation results are discussed that help to clarify 
issues pertaining to the limitations of the hedonic wage model when used to analyze teacher 
labor markets.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Data 
The data we use for this analysis comes from a larger database of teachers and schools 
that links seven administrative datasets and various other information characterizing districts, 
communities, and local labor markets in New York State. It includes information for every 
teacher and administrator employed in a New York public school at any time from 1969-70 
through 1999-2000. (See the table in Appendix A.) The core data comes from the Personnel 
Master File (PMF), part of the Basic Education Data System of the New York State Education 
Department. In a typical year there are approximately 200,000 teachers identified in the PMF.  
We have linked these annual records through time, yielding detailed data characterizing the 
career history of each individual.  
Several other databases that contain a range of information about the qualifications of 
prospective and actual teachers, as well as the environments in which these individuals make 
career decisions, substantially enrich this core data.   For teachers this information includes age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, salary, experience (in the district, in NYS public schools, and total), years 
of education and degree attainment, and teacher certification exam scores of individual teachers 
and whether they passed on their first attempts. In addition, we identify the institutions from 
which individual teachers earned their undergraduate degrees and combine it with the Barron’s 
ranking of college selectivity to construct variables measuring the selectivity of the college from 
which each teacher graduated and the location of the institution.  Measures for schools and  
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districts include enrollment, student poverty, racial composition, and district salary schedules, as 
well as many other measures. Using information on the zip code of residence when the teacher 
applied for certification and the zip code of each school, we create a “distance from home” 
measure for each school-teacher combination in our sample.  For a sub-sample of teachers we 
know where they lived while in high school.     
Our data is richer in its descriptions of teachers than other administrative datasets used to 
date, including teachers' test scores and undergraduate institutions.  It also allows us to match 
teachers to characteristics of the schools in which they teach in a way that most national 
longitudinal surveys, such as High School and Beyond or the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth, do not.  In a series of papers, we have used the data to document various characteristics 
of teacher labor markets, a number of which are pertinent here. 
First, as noted above, there is a marked sorting of teachers across schools.  For example, 
in schools in the highest quartile of student performance on the New York State 4
th Grade 
English Language Arts Exam only three percent of teachers are uncertified, only ten percent 
earned their undergraduate degree from least competitive colleges, and only nine percent of those 
who have taken a general knowledge teacher certification exam failed.
5  In contrast, in schools in 
the lowest quartile of student performance, 22 percent of teachers are uncertified, 26 percent 
come from least competitive colleges, and 35 percent have failed a general-knowledge 
certification exam (Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff, 2002).  Similar patterns are found when 
schools are grouped based on student poverty, race/ethnicity and limited English proficiency.  
These differences reflect urban-suburban differences in the qualifications of teachers as well as 
meaningful differences across schools within urban areas. 
                                                 
5 Teachers in New York have had the option of taking the NTE General Knowledge Exam or the NYSTCE Liberal 
Arts and Science Exam.  Throughout the paper “failure” refers to failing one of these exams on the first attempt.  
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Differences in the qualifications of teachers are the result of the decisions of individuals 
and school officials that determine initial job matches and subsequent decisions that affect job 
quits, transfers and terminations. Of these, initial job matches appear particularly important in 
that they account for almost all of the urban-suburban differences in teacher qualifications as 
well as a substantial portion of the differences between schools within urban districts.  To 
illustrate this, we track a cohort of entering teachers and assess the spread of teacher 
qualifications across groups in the first year and then in each following year for that same cohort.  
We define groups either by urban-suburban-region-status or by quartiles of student 
characteristics (race/ethnicity or achievement). On the initial match of the 1995 cohort, New 
York City urban schools had 17.1 percentage points more teachers who had failed a teacher 
certification exam than did non-NYC suburban schools. This difference had increased by 5.2 
points by the end of six years, implying that the initial match accounted for 77 percent of the 
disparity after six years, when most transfers had already taken place.  Within urban areas, the 
contributions of initial match and exits are roughly equal in determining the overall 
qualifications of teachers. When we compare the proportion of teachers failing the certification 
exam in New York City between schools in the top and bottom quartiles of percentage of 
students who are non-white, the initial gap for the 1995 cohort is 11.3 percentage points.  As this 
cohort ages to the year 2000, the gap enlarges to 19.7 percentage points, implying that quits and 
transfers have added 8.4 percentage points and that the initial match accounts for 58 percent of 
the total gap by 2000 (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2002a).  Given the relative 
importance of the initial matches of teachers to schools and the need to simplify the first 
implementation of our empirical model, we focus on these initial job matches and the sorting of 
teachers within the local labor markets.   
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A final characteristic of teacher labor markets worth noting is the surprisingly large 
number of individuals who take their first teaching job very close to where they grew up.  Over 
60 percent of teachers first teach within 15 miles of the district from which they graduated high 
school and 85 percent teach within 40 miles.  Even of those who travel over 100 miles to college, 
most return home to teach (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2002b).
6  This proximity has 
two important implications for modeling the sorting of teachers across jobs.  First, most teachers 
make job choices within a very limited geographic area.  Because of this, our empirical analysis 
of job match presented below, focuses on the matching of teachers to jobs within relatively small 
geographic areas (metropolitan areas) instead of across the entire State.  Second, even within 
each of these local labor markets, work proximity is likely to affect teachers’ rankings of 
alternative job opportunities.  Teachers will rank otherwise identical jobs differently because of 
differences in the relative proximity of jobs to the teachers’ own locations.  These ranking 
differences suggest that an accurate model of teacher labor markets will need to incorporate 
potential preference heterogeneity.  
 
III. Common Approaches for Modeling Sorting 
  Before describing our empirical sorting model in detail, it is worth reviewing several 
literatures pertinent to the study of the sorting of teachers across jobs.  These include the hedonic 
wage literature and at least two literatures concerned with two-sided matching.   
                                                 
6 Information regarding home location is drawn from either College Board data for all individuals who attended a 
NYS high school and took the SAT since 1980 or SUNY data for all individuals who applied to a SUNY campus 
anytime since 1990.  Thus, this analysis does not include individuals who did not apply to a SUNY school over this 
period and (1) attended high school out of state, (2) attended a NYS high school prior to 1980 or (3) attended a NYS 
high school but did not take the SAT.  How the above statistics would be affected by including these individuals in 
the calculations is not clear as the longer distances traveled by out-of-state students could be more than offset by the 
many students in New York City who did not take the SAT because they planned to attend CUNY which did not 
require the test. 
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Hedonic Wage Models:  Most previous studies of teacher labor markets, such as Antos 
and Rosen (1975), employ a hedonic wage framework, which can be illustrated using a relatively 
simple example. Suppose that teachers’ preferences over job attributes are reflected in the utility 
function  () q z S U U , =  where S is the salary paid and z is a non-pecuniary job attribute.  q is a 
scalar measure of some teacher attribute which might affect his/her preferences for S and z.  In a 
similar way,  () z q S V V , =  is assumed to characterize each employer’s preferences with respect 
to the salary paid and the teacher attribute conditional on the employer’s own attribute, z.  For 
example, suppose that z measures the innate ability of the students in the school and q measures 








V .  Furthermore, assume that U( ) is an 
increasing function of S and V( ) decreases in S. 
In the case where salaries clear the market, let  ) , ( q z S S =  represent the equilibrium wage 
function showing the salary a teacher having qualification q would be paid when working in a 
job having non-pecuniary attribute z.  The above assumptions imply that S will be a decreasing 
function of z and an increasing function of q.   
When salaries have adjusted so as to clear the market, each teacher is able to choose the 
school in which to teach only subject to his/her budget constraint, which would be S = S(z,q).  




















≡  is a teacher’s marginal evaluation of z measured in terms of forgone salary.  
Similarly, subject only to its budget constraint, each employer will choose a teacher of quality q 



















≡  is the employer’s marginal evaluation of q  
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measured in terms of it’s willingness to pay a higher salary.  The pertinent second-order 
conditions are assumed to hold.    
The equilibrium wage function,  ) , ( q z S S = , and the equilibrium allocation of teachers to 
jobs, here represented by q = q(z), are implied by the preferences of teachers and employers 
together with the distributions of z and q.  For example, in addition to the above assumptions 
regarding preferences, suppose that more qualified teachers have relatively higher marginal 
evaluations of z (i.e., 
U
zS MRS  is increasing in q) and that employers having relatively larger 
values of z have greater willingness to pay for q (i.e., 
V
qS MRS  is increasing in q).  In such a case, 






 so that schools having higher values of z will employ the teachers having 
higher values of q.  The exact functional form for q(z) will depend upon the distribution of z 
across jobs and the distribution of q across teachers.   
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate such a model.   ) , ( 1 q z S  in Figure 1a reflects the salary 
constraint faced by a teacher having qualification q1. Her ability to choose any point on this S-z 
locus together with her preferences imply that he/she will choose to teach in a school having (S1, 
z1) corresponding to point m on indifference curve  '
1 q I .  Similarly, an individual having 
qualification  ) ( 1 0 q q <  would face the salary constraint  ) , ( 0 q z S S =  and choose the salary-job 
attribute bundle represented by point n on indifference curve  '
o q I .   In Figure 1b, an employer 
having  0 z z =  would face the salary constraint  ) , ( 0 q z S S =  and choose to employ a teacher 
having qualification  o q q = and, correspondingly, pay S0.  As the location of  ) , ( 1 q z S  in the 
figure indicates, an employer having  ) ( 0 1 z z > would be able to pay a relatively lower salary at  
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each level of q and would choose (S1, q1).
7   Note that the choices of the teachers in Figure 1a are 
internally consistent with the choices of employers in 1b;  ) ( 0 0 z q q =  and  ) ( 1 1 z q q =  where q(z) 
is the equilibrium matching function defined above.
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Figure 1:  The Salary, Job Attribute, and Worker Attribute Relationship Used as a Basis 
for the Hedonic Approach to Estimating Compensating Differentials 
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The above model can be generalized to include vectors of job (Z) and worker (Q) 
attributes and, in turn, provide a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of worker-job match.  
For example, the assumed equilibrium wage equation,  ) , ( Q Z S S = , could be approximated using 
the function  kj j k j k kj Q Z Q Z S η β θ + Λ + + = '  where θ and β are vectors of parameters, Λ is a 
                                                 
7 Even though it is not the case here, note that different preferences could have resulted in the employer with  1 z z=  
having chosen a high value of q and a corresponding salary that was higher than S0.  This would result in a positive 
correlation between z and S in equilibrium, the opposite of what is shown in figures 1a and 1b. 
8  The indifference curves in Figures 1a and 1b correspond to the case where  () q z S q z S U 23 . 0 , + = ,  
() 5 . 0 4 . 0 , z q S z q S V + − = ,  10 0 = q ,  20 1 = q ,  10 0 = z  and  20 1 = z .  Furthermore, in deriving the hedonic wage 
equation, it is assumed that there is an equal number of candidates and employers and that the distributions of q and 
z are identical which, with positive assortative matching, implies that q = q(z) = z.  Following steps similar to those 
employed by Sattinger (1979), it can be shown that  () C z q q z S + − = 23 . 1 90 . 0 1869 . 0 4444 . 0 ,  where C is a constant  
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matrix of parameters and  kj η  is a random disturbance. If the dependent variable were the log 
wage, the i
th element of the column vector  '
j Q Λ + θ would be the percent change in the wage 
needed to attract a worker having attributes  j Q  when the value of the i
th element in  k Z  increased 
by one unit. Note that parameter estimates for such an equilibrium wage equation, by 
themselves, typically do not imply estimates of the underlying preference parameters for workers 
and employers (e.g., the parameters in U( ) and V( ) ).  Inferences regarding such preference 
parameters typically require a second-stage estimation (Rosen, 1974, 1986).  
Even though some labor market studies have carried out such two-stage estimation, there 
are far more studies that have focused on the first-stage estimation of empirical wage equation 
parameters.   However, estimates of such wage equations in a wide range of settings, including 
teacher labor markets, have proven inconsistent.  Researchers have posited a number of reasons 
for the inconsistencies including omitted variables (Brown, 1980; Lucas, 1977), simultaneity 
(McLean,1978), measurement error, and labor market frictions (Hwang, Mortensen and Reed, 
1998; Lang and Majumdar, 2001).  In the case of teacher labor markets, omitted variables 
characterizing schools, students and teachers and the endogenous determination of pertinent 
school policies have been offered as possible explanations for counterintuitive hedonic wage 
results.  However, there are other problems with hedonic models in the context of the market for 
public school teachers, as well as public-sector labor markets more generally. 
First, contradicting a basic assumption of the hedonic wage model, public-sector salaries 
are unlikely to clear their respective markets and, as a result, do not fully adjust for differences in 
both the attributes of workers and the non-pecuniary attributes of their jobs.  Salaries in the 
public sector often are inflexible because they are set through a combination of political, 
                                                                                                                                                             
of integration that could be determined by specifying the reservation wage associated with alternative employment  
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administrative and collective bargaining processes, rather than as a result of direct market forces. 
In the case of teacher labor markets, union contracts often set teacher salaries for three or more 
years and social decision-making practices limit both the variation and the flexibility of the 
wage.  Furthermore, district wage schedules typically dictate that all teachers in the district with 
the same number of years of education and experience earn the same salary, regardless of their 
other attributes or the characteristics of the schools in which they teach.  This limitation is 
especially restrictive in large urban districts and large countywide districts in which there is 
considerable within-district variation in the non-wage attributes of schools.   
In a setting where teacher salaries do not clear the labor market, those salaries will not 
reflect compensating differentials for non-pecuniary job characteristics.  Consider a modification 
of the above model where  () z S S * =  reflect a predetermined pattern of wages.  Even though 
() * S  also could be a function of q, we consider the simpler case since it is roughly consistent 
with the institutional feature that salaries do not vary with any of a range of teacher 
qualifications, other than educational attainment and experience.  In this setting, each employer’s 
value of  ( ) z q z S V V ), ( * =  will be increasing in q over its entire range so that every employer 
will want to hire the highest quality teacher possible – a result which differs from that in the 
hedonic wage model.   Whether teachers will prefer higher or lower values of z (i.e., whether 
( ) q z z S U U ), ( * =  is increasing or decreasing in z) will depend upon whether  U
zS MRS  is larger 
or smaller than 
z d
S d *
− .   The general point is that with salaries being predetermined, some jobs 
simply will provide more utility to workers than other jobs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
in another occupation or home production.   In the example, C was arbitrarily set to equal 10.  
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Figure 2a illustrates the case where the salary reductions teachers are willing to give up in 
exchange for an increase in z are everywhere smaller in magnitude than the actual salary 
reduction needed.  In such a case, all teachers will prefer the lowest level of z possible so that 
there will be an excess supply for jobs having low values of z.  Figure 2b illustrates the reverse 
case where S*( ) is such that all workers prefer jobs having higher values of z, leading to those 
jobs having an excess supply of teachers.
9  
Figure 2: The Salary, Job Attribute, and Worker Attribute Relationship 
When Wages Do Not Clear the Market 
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With price not adjusting so as to equilibrate demand and supply at each level of q and z, a 
non-price rationing mechanism will be needed to determine the matching of teachers to jobs.  We 
maintain a deferred acceptance mechanism in the game-theoretic, two-sided matching model that 
underlies our empirical analysis.  Here we will leave the mechanism unspecified, but note that 
there is a fairly obvious outcome when all agents on each side of the market have the same rank 
                                                 
9 Rather than S*( ) being a dercreasing function of z as assumed in figure 2, the salary paid could be higher in those 
schools having higher values of the desirable attribute z; dS*/dz > 0.  The New York City is one such example 
where both salaries and working are relatively more attractive in the surrounding suburbs. (Lankford, Loeb and 
Wyckoff  (2002)).    
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ordering of the alternatives on the other side.  In such a case, the employer having the job all 
teachers agree is most attractive would be able to hire its top choice.  In turn, the employer 
having the second most attractive job will be able to hire the individual it ranks highest among 
the remaining individuals, and so on.   
In Figure 2a, S*( ) is such that all teachers prefer lower values of z.  With all employers 
preferring higher values of q, non-price rationing would result in an allocation characterized by 
negative assortative matching.  In Figure 2b, S*( ) is such that the resulting allocation would be 
characterized by positive assortative matching, the same allocation as in the hedonic wage 
equilibrium. In neither case will the change in salary associated with a change z,  z
S
∂
∂ , reflect 
teachers’ marginal evaluations of z.  This results from the fact that teachers are not able to 
choose jobs subject only to their individual budget constraints.  In particular, there is non-price 
rationing that results from the choices made by the most attractive job candidates and their 
employers affecting the available alternatives and, thereby, directly constraining the choices 
available to others.  The implications of non-price rationing would be the same when preference 
heterogeneity or the properties of S*( ), or a combination of the two, results in  U




−  for some values of z and q, with the inequality reversed for other values. 
In summary, even if salaries are an important condition of work affecting the allocation 
of teachers across jobs, there is little reason to believe that those salaries would imply a set of 
implicit prices that reflect teachers’ marginal evaluations of various job attributes.  Insufficient 
price flexibility results in excess demand for the jobs that are relatively more attractive so that 
the job choices of workers will be constrained by more than just their individual budget 
constraints.  The non-price rationing brought about by insufficient price flexibility will prevent  
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workers from choosing bundles of job attributes for which their marginal evaluations mirror the 
implicit prices for those attributes in the market.  Thus, the applicability of the standard hedonic 
model is limited in settings where the choice set for each job candidate is affected directly by the 
choices made by others beyond the effects of those choices on the candidate’s budget constraint. 
In such settings, there is little reason to think that the wage locus will reflect marginal valuations 
on either side of the market.  While true for teacher labor markets, this will also be the case in 
other setting where wages are set administratively or for some other reason do not clear the 
market for job and worker attributes.  
The applicability of the hedonic wage model to teacher labor markets is also affected by 
the apparently small geographic scope of these markets.  When labor markets are small, there 
may not be sufficient numbers of jobs and candidates in each local market to assure that the 
distributions of employer and employee attributes are continuous.  In this setting, discrete choice 
models such as random utility models are likely to be more pertinent in the analysis of job choice 
(Freeman 1979; Palmquist 1991).    
The importance of distance to teachers making job choices implies not only that labor 
markets are limited geographically but also that there is likely to be heterogeneity of preferences 
within each labor market.  Teachers may rank the same job differently because of their location 
relative to the school.  Some hedonic models have included distance measures; rent-gradient 
models, for example, have assumed that individuals prefer living as close as possible to the 
central city.  However, the importance of distance more generally implies that each job candidate 
has a different assessment of the value of a particular job because the assessment depends upon 
his/her own location.  Such extreme heterogeneity is difficult to incorporate into traditional 
hedonic models, as the geographical distributions of jobs and job candidates typically will be  
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quite idiosyncratic from application to application.  Yet the implicit prices of various attributes 
can vary by location depending upon the relative proximity of candidates and jobs having 
different attributes.  Estimates that do not account for the heterogeneity are likely to be biased. 
In light of the limitations of applying hedonic wage models to the teacher labor market, 
we propose to develop and estimate structural models drawing upon the game-theoretic two-
sided matching literature.  These models will account for pertinent features of teacher labor 
markets, including wage rigidities and the resulting non-price rationing of jobs and teachers, as 
well as for factors affecting the separate, but interdependent, choices made by job candidates and 
school officials.  Preferences with respect to distance and other sources of preference 
heterogeneity enter in a straightforward manner.  Furthermore, our estimation strategy allows the 
underlying preference parameters to be estimated in one step rather than the two-steps required 
when using the hedonic approach. 
Two-sided matching:  The two-sided matching literature is applicable to a broad range of 
settings having the common feature that individuals in one group are matched with individuals, 
agents or firms in a separate, second group.  Examples include models of marriage, employment 
and college attendance.
10  In all of these cases, the matching is two-sided in that whether a 
particular match occurs depends upon separate choices made by the two parties.  Furthermore, 
these choices are not made in isolation.  “A worker’s willingness to accept employment at a firm 
depends not only on the characteristics of the firm but also the other possible options open to the 
worker.  The better an individual’s opportunities elsewhere, the more selective he or she will be 
in evaluating a potential partner” (Burdett and Coles, 1999). 
                                                 
10 These cases differ from the roommate problem where those being matched come from the same group.  In two-
sided match models all agents fall into one of two distinct groups and seek a match with one or more agents in the 
other group.  
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  Within the two-sided matching literature, there are now a large number of papers that 
build upon the work of Gale and Shapley (1962) and are concerned with the allocation 
(matching) of fixed numbers of agents from two disjoint sets.  This game-theoretic research has 
considered both one-to-one matching such as marriage and many-to-one matching such as 
employment and college-admission, the former being a special case of the latter.
11  While a 
growing number of papers allow utility to be transferable so that the division of match surplus is 
determined endogenously at the time partners match, most game-theoretic models have assumed 
that utility is nontransferable; that is, how the surplus from any given match is split between the 
matching pair is predetermined.  This more traditional assumption is applicable to teacher labor 
markets since salaries (set through collective bargaining), other conditions of work
12, and the 
attributes of teacher candidates are fixed in the short-run. 
  In addition to the game-theoretic studies, there is a large literature in labor economics 
employing two-sided matching models with search.  This research distinguishes itself in a 
number of respects.  First, whereas almost all the game-theoretic models assume full information 
and no market frictions, such frictions are central to the labor-search models of marriage and job 
match.  A second difference is that the demand side of the labor-search models often is 
characterized by free entry of profit maximizing firms, so that the number of jobs to be filled is 
not fixed as in the game-theoretic match literature.  A third difference that is especially pertinent 
for our empirical analysis concerns the extent and nature of agent heterogeneity allowed in the 
                                                 
11 In addition to the papers focusing on decentralized allocation mechanisms, extensive research has addressed 
centralized mechanisms such as those used to assign medical interns to hospitals.  Roth and Sotomayer (1990) 
provide a clear synthesis of both the theoretical literature to date and how the theoretical findings provide important 
insights regarding implications of the institutional features characterizing the centralized matching algorithms used, 
as well as factors that have contributed to the evolution of those features.   
12  In teacher labor markets, many conditions of work are inflexible, including the location of the school and student 
body characteristics.  Job attributes such as class size and teacher preparation time, while not completely inflexible, 
are constrained by the political process and collective bargaining.   
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models.  Game-theoretic two-sided match models typically only require that each agent’s 
ranking of match partners is complete and transitive, with no restrictions regarding the extent of 
preference heterogeneity.  In contrast, the search models either maintain homogeneity of 
preferences or allow for only limited heterogeneity.   Some models maintain match 
heterogeneity, where agents in each group are ex-ante identical but some matches are relatively 
more productive, with the productivity of each possible match determined by a random draw 
from some known distribution.  Other models maintain ex-ante heterogeneity where there are 
systematic differences across agents independent of the partners to whom they are matched, with 
all agents in one group having the same ranking of the potential partners in the other.  For 
example, some workers may be more productive than others and some jobs may be more or less 
attractive.  Limitations on the degree of heterogeneity are needed in order to solve for the search 
equilibriums (Burdett and Coles, 1999).  Such limited heterogeneity would be quite restrictive if 
maintained in our analysis, in part because teachers’ rankings of school alternatives are likely to 
differ reflecting their own proximity to those schools.  For this reason, our model builds on the 
game-theoretic approach, with the hope of incorporating market frictions into later work. 
 
IV.  The Model  
Consider an environment in which  { } 1,, J Cc c = L  represents the set of J individuals 
seeking teaching jobs and  { } 1,, K Ss s = L  represents the set of K schools having jobs to be filled, 
K J ≥ .  For now assume that each school has one job opening though this is relaxed in the 
empirical analysis.  We assume that each agent has a complete and transitive preference ordering 
over the agents on the other side of the market and that these orderings arise from job candidates’  
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preferences over job attributes and hiring authorities’ preferences over the attributes of 
candidates. 
Let  jk u  represent the utility of working in the k
th school as viewed from the perspective 
of the j
th candidate where 
12 (, ,) jk k jk j jk uu z d q β δ =+ .  
1
k z  is a vector of observed attributes of the 
k
th school pertinent to the j
th individual and  jk d  is the distance to the k
th job for the candidate.  
Vector 
2
j q  represents observed attributes of the j
th candidate that affect the individual’s 
assessment of the k
th alternative and β  is a vector of parameters.   jk δ  is a random variable 
reflecting unobserved heterogeneity in the attractiveness of a particular school for different 
individuals. If no job match is entered, the individual’s utility is uj0  which depends upon 
observed and unobserved attributes of the individual.  Thus, the individual will always turn down 
a job offer if uj k <  uj0.  Here we assume that ujk  >  uj0   for all k and j but plan to allow for the 
more general case when we extend the model to consider all candidates, not just those actually 
obtaining jobs. 
The hiring authority for the k
th school is assumed to have preferences over the attributes 
of job candidates.  Let 
12 (, ) jk j k jk vv q z αω =+  represent the attractiveness of the j
th candidate from 
the perspective of the hiring authority for school k.  The vector 
1
j q  represents pertinent observed 
attributes of the j
th candidate. The vector 
2
k z  represents the observed attributes of the k
th school 
that might affect the authority’s assessment of the j
th candidate.  α  is a vector of parameters.  The 
random error  kj ω  reflects unobserved factors.  To simplify the analysis, we assume hiring 
authorities prefer all of the candidates to the alternative of leaving job vacancies unfilled.  This  
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assumption, combined with the assumption that there are sufficient numbers of willing 
candidates, implies that all job openings will be filled. 
Consider a case where the sets C and S are known, as are the values of 
12 (,) jj j qq q ≡  for 
each candidate and 
12 (,) kk k zz z ≡  for each job.  Given the vector of parameters β  and a particular 
set of random variable draws for the  jk δ , the formula 
12 (, ,) jk k jk j jk uu z d q β δ =+  implies the 
matrix of candidates’ benefits represented in panel (A) of Figure 3.   Each row shows the benefits 
that a particular candidate attributes to being employed in each of the K school alternatives.  
These rows of benefit values, in turn, imply candidates’ complete rankings of school alternatives 
shown in panel  (C).   c
jk r  is the jth candidate’s ranking of the kth school alternative.  In a similar 
way, the vector of parameters α  and a particular set of random variable draws for the  kj ω , 
together with the formula 
12 (, ) jk j k jk vv q z αω =+ , imply the matrix of school benefits represented 
in panel (B) of Figure 3 and the complete rankings of candidates by hiring authorities shown in 
panel (D).   Each column of panel B shows the benefits to a particular school of having an 
opening filled by each of the alternative candidates.  s
jk r  is the ranking of the j
th candidate from 
the perspective of the k
th employer. 
If each of the candidates unilaterally were able to choose the school in which to teach, the 
framework summarized in panel A would imply that β  in 
12 (, ,) jk k jk j jk uu z d q β δ =+  could be 
estimated using data characterizing those choices and a standard multinomial probit or logit 
random utility model.  Similarly, α  could be estimated easily using the same type model if each 
hiring authority unilaterally chose among candidates.  However, the empirical model we employ 
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Figure 3: Utility and Rankings of Candidates and Schools 
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is more complex for two reasons.  First, it is the interaction of decisions made by a candidate and 
a hiring authority for a school that determines whether the two are matched.  Second, even 
though any such interaction would complicate the model, the decisions made by the two parties 
considering whether to match crucially depend upon the choices made by all other candidates 
and employers.  In particular, a candidate’s willingness to accept a particular match depends 
upon her own preferences as well as her “effective” choice set, i.e., the set of schools willing to 
hire her given their own “effective” alternatives.  In turn, whether employers make the candidate 
an offer will depend upon whether they prefer to employ alternative candidates who are willing 
to fill their positions, and so on.
13  
                                                 
13 To see how one can have a model with joint decisions that avoids this complexity, one need only consider a two-
sided search model in which candidates and employers randomly meet and individually decide whether they are 
willing to match based upon reservation-wage decision rules, with a match occurring only if both agree.  The  
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Because our framework is an example of the standard two-sided matching model 
extensively studied by game theorists, many of the theoretical findings in that literature directly 
apply to our analysis (Roth and Sotomayer, 1990).  As is common in the literature, we assume 
that there is a decentralized job-match mechanism having the following characteristics.  Each 
employer makes an offer to its highest ranked prospect.  Job candidates receiving offers reject 
those that are dominated either by remaining unemployed or by better job offers, and “hold” their 
best offers if they dominate being unemployed.   Employers whose offers are rejected make 
second round offers to their second highest ranked choices.  Employers whose offers remain 
open stay in communication with these candidates but otherwise take no action.  Job candidates 
receiving better offers inform employers that they are rejecting the less attractive positions 
previously held.  In subsequent steps each employer having an opening with no outstanding offer 
makes an offer to its top candidate among the set of job seekers who have not already rejected an 
offer from the employer.  Employees in turn respond.  This deferred acceptance procedure 
continues until firms have filled all their positions with their top choices among those not having 
a better offer or have made unsuccessful offers to all their acceptable candidates.  As shown by 
Gale and Shapley (1962), such an allocation mechanism always will yield a stable matching, in 
the sense that there will be no candidate and employer currently not matched who both would 
prefer to be matched to each other rather than to the agents to whom they are matched.  
Furthermore, if the rankings are strict (i.e., no agent is indifferent between any two alternatives), 
the resulting stable matching will be both unique and employer-optimal (i.e., all employers 
weakly prefer this match to all other stable matches).  Alternatively, a deferred acceptance 
                                                                                                                                                             
relative simplicity of this model comes from the underlying assumptions of the model that imply the reservation-
threshold for any agent is not affected by the choices made by any other agent.  In contrast, the model we use 
explicitly allows for complex interactions.   Furthermore, our model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in agents’  
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procedure in which candidates made offers to hiring authorities would result in an employee-
optimal matching. 
The equilibrium employer-optimal stable matching corresponding to the alternatives and 
rankings characterized in Figure 3 is represented in the left side of Figure 4.  The right side of 
Figure 4 characterizes this matching in terms of the resulting relationship between the attributes 
of candidates and the schools where they are employed. 
The matching of candidates to schools represented in Figure 4 corresponds to particular 
values of the model’s random variables ( jk δ  and  kj ω ; j = 1,2,…,J and k = 1,2,…,K), the 
explanatory variables (e.g.,  j q  and  k z ) and the parameters  () () β α θ , =  of the model. Given the  
 
Figure 4:  Resulting Matching of teachers and Jobs 
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implied rankings for candidates and employers, deriving such a stable matching is relatively easy 
using the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm.
14  However, deriving closed-form expressions for 
the likelihood of observing any particular candidate-job matching or the probability distribution 
of any particular distribution of worker and job attributes is impossible.  To compute the 
likelihood of a particular stable matching one would need to identify the set of all possible 
                                                                                                                                                             
rankings of alternatives whereas search models typically assume there are common rankings or only very limited 
heterogeneity. 
14 Note that multiple worker-job matchings will yield the same distribution of matched attributes if either multiple 
candidates or multiple jobs have the same observed attributes.  
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combinations of the random errors that would lead to that same stable matching.  This would 
entail determining all possible combinations of the rankings of candidates and employers that 
would yield a particular matching and, in turn, all the combinations of random variable values 
that would lead to each of those sets of rankings.  This is an impossible task, especially since it 
would have to be done repeatedly for various parameter values.  Even if the ranges of the various 
random errors could be identified, computation of the corresponding likelihood would be 
impossible given that the implied integrals would have high dimensions and very complex 
regions of integration.
15  These complexities motivate our use of a method of simulated moments 
(MSM) estimation strategy. 
  Before discussing the MSM approach, it is first necessary to generalize the notation and 
framework.  Whereas the above discussion was for a single market at one point in time, our 
empirical analysis considers M local labor markets, m = 1,2,…,M, and T years, t = 1,2,…,T.  To 
account for this generalization, we need only add the subscripts “m” and “t” to the explanatory 
and random variables defined above.  For example,  mtj q  represents the attributes of the j
th 
candidate first employed in the m
th market during time period t.  An assumption is needed to 
allow for multiple job openings in a single school in any given year.  With our empirical analysis 
focusing on elementary schools where there is a large degree of homogeneity across teaching 
jobs, we assume that all job openings within a school are identical. As shown in the two-sided 
match literature, the pertinent theoretical underpinning for a many-to-one match parallels that for 
one-to-one matches discussed above. 
 Let  mtki q  represent the attributes of the teacher newly employed during period t to fill the 
i
th vacancy of school k in labor market m where i = 1,2,…, mtk n and  mtk n  is the total number of job 
                                                 
15 Berry (1992) makes a similar point in a game-theoretic model of entry in the airline industry.  
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openings in the k
th school for that year.  (Reflecting the two-sided match,  mtki q from the 
perspective of this employer is the same as  mtj q  defined above from the perspective of the 
employee where j is the individual employed to fill the k
th firm’s i
th position.)  The structure of 
the two-sided matching model, values of parameters α  and β  and the distributions of sets of 
random variables  jk δ  and  kj ω , together imply the joint distribution of  mtk z  and mtki q , j = 1,2,…,J 
and k = 1,2,…,K.  This in turn implies the expected value of  mtki q  for the k
th school, 
() ; mtki mtk Eq z θ .  Subscript i in this expression can be dropped as a result of the assumption that 
all the job openings within the school are identical, which implies the expected values for all 
positions within the schools are identical.  The above expression implies that 
() ;0 mtki mtk mtk mtk Eq Eq z z θ  −=  
; for a school having attributes  mtk z , the difference between 
the attributes of the i
th newly hired teacher,  mtki q , and the expected mean attributes, given  mtk z , is 
zero in expectation.  In turn, this implies that  () ( ) ;0 mtk mtki mtk mtk Ez q E q z θ  −=  ; across 
schools, the difference between the actual and expected attributes of the new teachers hired by a 
school is orthogonal to the school’s own attributes. 
  The sample analog of the last expression is   () [] ∑∑∑ = −
tki
mtk mtk mtki mtk z q E q z 0 ; | θ  which 
can be rewritten  () [] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk mtk z q E q z n 0 ; | θ , where  mtk q  is the mean attributes of the 
new teachers employed by the kth school.   We employ this moment condition in our  
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estimation.
16  Similarly, we use  () [ ] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk mtk z d E d z n 0 ; | θ  which relates the 
average distance for those newly employed in a school,  mtk d , to the corresponding expectation; 
and  () [ ] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk z d E d n 0 ; | θ , which relates to the overall average distance traveled by 
new teachers in a market.  Note that the three moment equations are defined at the market level, 
implying that there is a set of such conditions for each market included in the analysis.  We do 
not employ the moment condition  () [] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk z q E q n 0 ; | θ  for the empirical estimates 
to follow because, this condition holds for all θ  since our analysis only includes candidates who 
obtained jobs and, thus, the mean attributes of teachers are fixed.   
An issue that arises in implementing our estimation strategy concerns the fact that 
() ; mtk mtk Eq z θ  and  () ; mtk mtk Ed z θ  are not easily computed; it is not possible to write out, 
much less compute, analytical expressions for these expected values.  We instead compute 
values for these expressions using simulation.   Our method of simulated moment estimation 
strategy is described in Appendix B.  In short, the MSM estimator,  ˆ θ , is the value of θ  which 
minimizes a quadratic form defined in terms of the moment conditions.  In effect, the parameter 
estimates minimize the distance between moments reflecting the empirical distribution of 
teachers across schools and the corresponding theoretical moments implied by our model. 
Within the burgeoning set of papers employing the method of simulated moments, we 
know of three papers that have substantial overlap with our application.  Epple and Sieg (2001) 
                                                 
16 Equivalently, we could have employed   ( ) ;0 mtj mtk mtj mtk Eq z E z q θ   −=    
and its sample analog 
() |; 0 mtj mtj mtj mtj
tj
qz E zq θ  −= ∑∑   where  mtj z  represents the attributes of the job held by the jth candidate;   
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employ the method of simulated moments approach to estimate Tiebout equilibrium models of 
residential choice.  Their moment conditions relate to the equilibrium, one-sided sorting of 
households to local communities.  Berry (1992) has employed a simulation estimator to estimate 
an equilibrium game-theoretic model of market entry in the airline industry, with the simulated 
moments based on the equilibrium number of firms operating at each airport each year.  Sieg 
(2000) has estimated a bargaining model of medical malpractice disputes.  Even though this 
analysis focuses on bilateral interactions between individual plaintiffs and defendants, rather than 
a market-level analysis, the paper is pertinent in that the simulated moments are obtained by 
repeatedly solving a game-theoretic model for each of a large number of draws of the model’s 
random variables, as is the case in Berry’s analysis. 
 
V. Estimates of Several Models 
  As the first test of this model we look at the initial sorting of first through sixth grade 
teachers across schools in the Albany-Schenectady-Troy, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and 
Utica-Rome metropolitan areas for school years 1994-95 through 1999-2000.
17  We estimate the 
following utility functions. 
 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) jk jk u δ β β β β β + + + + + = distance urban poor % minority % salary 5 4 3 2 1  
                        (3) 
() jk jk v ω α + = lity teacherqua 1  
 
Thus, the jth teachers’ utility associated with working in the kth job,  jk u ,  is assumed to be a 
function of salary, the percent of students in the school who are black or Hispanic, the percent of 
                                                                                                                                                             
() |; mtk mtk mtk mtk mtk
tk
nz q E q z θ  − ∑∑   will always equal  () |; mtj mtj mtj mtj
tj
qz E zq θ  − ∑∑  .  
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poor students in the school as measured by eligibility for free lunch, whether the school is in an 
urban area, and distance.  Distance is measured from the address given when the individual 
applied for certification, a point in time typically prior to when individuals apply for teaching 
jobs.  (While an alternative distance measure based on their location when in high school may be 
preferable because it is not endogenous to where teachers hope to teach, we do not have this for 
all teachers.)    If the distance to each district in the labor market where the individual took a job 
was greater than 50 miles, the distance measures for all job alternatives were set equal, so that 
distance would not be a factor in the candidate’s choice of jobs.  The attractiveness of the j
th 
candidate from the perspective of the hiring authority for school k,  jk v , is a function of teacher 
qualifications measured as a scalar composite of  (1) whether the teacher ever failed a liberal arts 
certification test; (2) the test score on the certification exam; (3) the Barron’s rating of his/her 
undergraduate institution; and (3) whether or not he/she has attained more than a Bachelor’s 
degree.
18  Both equations have normal random errors that are standardized, with no loss of 
generality, to have standard deviations of one.  We then run a number of alternative models. 
Table 1 presents the sample statistics.  Starting salaries average $32,458 with a small 
standard deviation of $2,607.  On average 21 percent of students in a school were black or 
Hispanic and 29 percent were poor.  Many more new teachers were hired in recent years.  Few 
(6.4 percent) were black or Hispanic, and for those traveling less than 100 miles to their job, the 
average distance was only ten miles.  For the estimation, salary and distance were normalized to 
standard deviation units.   
                                                                                                                                                             
17 With computational limitations necessitating that we exclude the New York City metropolitan area, our analysis 
includes the other large metropolitan areas in the state. 
18 We used principal component analysis to determine the weights used in constructing the composite.  The 
eigenvalue is 1.65 and the weightings are 0.6773 for test score, 0.6087 for failing, 0.3089 for college selectivity and 
0.1603 for higher degree.  
  29
The MSM estimations rely on 45 moment conditions.  For each of the five labor markets 
these correspond to teacher quality interacted with each of the four school characteristics (salary, 
percent minority, percent free lunch, and urban), distance interacted with each of the four school 
characteristics, and overall average distance.  
Table 2 gives the method of simulated moments results.   The results corresponding to 
Equation 3 are in the first column.  Note that all the estimated coefficients are of the expected 
signs and standard errors are quite small.  Teacher qualifications have a positive effect on 
employer utility.  Salary has a positive effect on teacher utility; while percent minority and 
distance both have negative effects.  The coefficients on percent poor and urban are smaller but 
also negative and statistically significant at traditional levels.  To interpret the size of these 
effects we can compare the coefficient estimates across variables or compare the size of the 
effect to the variance of the error (signal to noise).  For example, the utility loss associated with 
teaching in a school having 30 percent more minority students (approximately one standard 
deviation) is 0.46, an effect that could be offset by roughly a $3,475 increase in salary (1.3 
standard deviations).  Teacher qualifications as measured by test scores and college attended 
contributes to schools’ assessments of potential teachers.  A one standard deviation increase in 
qualifications increases utility by 0.35 points.  With the error in this equation and the teacher 
qualifications factor both having standard deviations equal to one, the overall variance in utility 
is 1.119 (alpha squared times the variation in qualifications plus the variation of the random 
error), assuming that qualifications are orthogonal to the error.   Thus, our qualifications measure 
appears to account for somewhat more than ten percent of the total variance in utility. 
As noted above, a potential advantage of the empirical model developed here is the ease 
with which preference heterogeneity can be taken into account, in particular the heterogeneity  
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resulting for teacher-job proximity.  The large magnitude of the distance coefficient estimate 
underscores that this is important. To investigate the importance of accounting for distance 
further, the second column of Table 2 reports results with distance omitted from the model.  The 
coefficient on qualifications drops by more than half though it remains significant.  Salary, 
percent minority, percent poor and urban also continue to significantly affect utility though the 
relative importance of percent minority increases relative to salary and the overall proportion of 
variances explained decreased markedly.  Overall, distance is an important explanatory variable 
and provides important identification in the standard model.
19  
  The third model in Table 2 introduces the race/ethnicity of candidates into the utility 
function of the employers.  This does not substantially change the coefficients on the other 
variables but does show that employers value minority candidates. They appear to be willing to 
tradeoff approximately one-half a standard deviation in the quality index for a non-white teacher.  
Model IV adds an interaction between the measure of school racial composition and whether or 
not a teacher is non-white.  The estimates for the teachers’ utility do not show a difference 
between white and non-white teachers in the effect of the proportion of non-white students.  Both 
sets of teachers prefer schools with lower proportions of minority students.  This result could 
easily arise if this measure of student body composition were proxying for unmeasured 
characteristics of neighborhoods and schools.  Distance continues to play an important role in 
this specification.  When distance is removed from the equation in Model V, the results are 
qualitatively different.  Without adjustments for distance it appears that non-white teachers favor 
                                                 
19 It is not surprising that the estimated coefficients for salary, percents minority and poor and the urban dummy fall 
when distance is dropped from the criterion function for candidates; a proportionate reduction in all these 
coefficients is equivalent to an increase in the standard deviation of the random error in the equation which we 
normalized to equal one.  Dropping distance from the equation results in it being subsumed in the error term.  These 
parameter estimates not changing proportionately and the coefficient for the quality index in the employers’ criterion 
function also showing a marked change both likely reflect the fact that the geographical distributions of candidates 
and schools vary systematically with respect to their attributes.    
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higher percent minority schools.  This change is likely a result of non-white teachers being 
geographically clustered near schools with higher proportions of non-white students.  The final 
model in Table 3 adds a squared term for distance.  As might be expected the linear term is 
negative and the squared term, positive, iIndicating that the effect of distance is stronger when 
the distance is short.   
  
VI.  Hedonic Model Estimates and Simulations 
It is constructive to compare the above estimates with those from the traditional wage-
equation approach.  Table 3 reports parameter estimates for the following two equations: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ε β β β β β + + + + + = urban %poor %minority s lification teacherqua salary 4 3 2 1 0  
                         (4) 
() ( ) ( ) () η α α α α α + + + + + = urban %poor %minority salary lity teacherqua 4 3 2 1 0  
 
 
We include a specification having quality as the dependent variable because some studies have 
used this approach as an alternative to the traditional wage equation (Loeb and Page, 2001).  
Furthermore, such a specification corresponds to the function q = q(z) reflecting the equilibrium 
allocation of teacher to jobs.  Note that such a function has relevance whether or not the wage 
clears the market.  Fixed effects for years and for metropolitan areas are included in columns II 
and IV of each panel. Estimates in column III include a dummy variable for whether or not the 
teacher is non-white and an interaction of non-white with the percent of minority students.  
Column IV estimates include measures of distance to job: both a continuous measure of distance 
for those who travel 100 miles or less to their job and a dummy variable for traveling farther. 
The wage models produce typically inconsistent results.  In the wage equation, salaries 
are higher in schools with higher proportions of minority students (which we might predict,  
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especially if racial composition proxies for other school or neighborhood characteristics that are 
not appealing to teachers).  Yet, there appears to be no premium for better teacher qualifications, 
and teachers are willing to take lower salaries to teach in schools with high proportions of 
children in poverty and in urban schools.  In the quality equations, there is again no relationship 
between quality and salary; but at the same wage, schools with higher proportions of poor 
students appear to attract less-qualified teachers.  This specification shows no relationship 
between qualifications and either urban or the percent of minority students.  The one exception to 
this is for non-white teachers whose qualifications are lower in high proportion minority 
schools.
20  Clearly, it would be difficult to draw policy implications from these inconsistent 
results. 
   Given the wide use of the hedonic model, it is pertinent to investigate further why a 
wage model and our empirical two-sided matching model yield such different results.  We do 
this by carrying out Monte Carlo simulations. Preferences are assumed to be as follows for 150 
employers each having on average 3 openings and 450 teachers seeking those positions.  
() () ( ) ( ) 11 22 3 4 Zd i s t a n c e jk jk u Z salary δ ββ β β σδ =+ + + + 
                         
() teacherquality jk jk v ω ασ ω =+  
 
The locations of teachers and schools are represented by scalar variables LT and LS, respectively, 
so that a teacher’s distance to a particular school equals  ST LL − .    The values of LS, Z1, Z2 and 
salary for each school, the values of LT and teacherquality for each teacher as well as the values 
of the errors terms  jk δ and  jk ω were obtained by making 100 sets of independent random draws 
from the standard normal distribution.  For given values of the preference parameters and the 
                                                 
20 Market-level hedonics produce similarly unintuitive results.  
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standard deviations  δ σ  and  ω σ , the teacher-employer stable matching implied by the matching 
algorithm underlying our model was determined for each of the 100 draws.  In turn, the 
following salary and quality equations were estimated for each draw and mean values of the 
parameter estimates were computed for the given values of the parameters and correlations.    
() () ( ) 01 1 2 2 3 salary Z Z teacherquality γγ γ γ ε =+ + + +  
                          () () ( ) 01 1 22 3 teacherquality Z Z salary ττ τ τ ξ =+ + + +  
In this way we investigate how differing (i.) the degree of correlation among the variables and 
(ii.) the preferences of teachers and schools affect parameter estimates in the salary and quality 
equations.  A number of general trends emerge which are illustrated in Table 4 where the first 
number in each cell is the average of the parameter estimates and the second is the proportion of 
the 100 estimates that are statistically significant (p<.05). 
  First, when there is no correlation among variables in the model and teachers do not have 
preferences over distance, the wage equation gives coefficients that qualitatively reflect 
preferences.  In Comparison 1 β 3, α , σ δ , and σ ω  all equal 1 and β 4 equals zero. If β 1 and β 2 equal 
zero the mean estimates of γ 1, γ 2 and γ 3  in the wage equation equal -0.0003, -0.009 and 0.699, 
respectively.  The estimates for γ 3 are statistically significant in all of the simulations, while those 
for γ 1 and γ 2 are significant 24 percent and 19 percent of the time.  If β 1 and β 2 increase to 0.3 and 
0.6, respectively, the estimates change to -0.13, -0.27, and 0.73.  If β 1 and β 2 increase again to 
0.6 and 1.2, the estimates change to –0.22, -0.45 and 0.78, respectively, with the estimates of γ 2 
and γ 3 statistically distinguishable from zero in all simulations and the estimate of γ 1 statistically 
significant in all but one draw.  
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  Second, when salary is correlated with another school characteristics, Z1, the coefficient 
on Z1 reflects that correlation, even if candidates do not value Z1.  Consider the same example as 
above, except with β 1 and β 2 equal to zero (Comparison 2). When the correlation between Z1 and 
salary equals zero, the mean estimates of γ 1, γ 2 and γ 3 equal -0.0003, -0.009, and 0.70.  The 
estimate of γ 1 is significant in 24 percent of the simulations.  When the correlation is 0.3, the 
estimates are 0.16, -0.01 and 0.67; and γ 1 is significant in 97 percent of the simulations.  When 
the correlation is 0.6, the coefficient estimates are 0.38, -0.01 and 0.54, not reflecting the 
underlying preferences for Z1 at all.  Furthermore, the estimate of γ 1 is significant in all of the 
simulations. 
  Third, when distance enters candidates’ preferences, or similarly when a relative increase 
in noise raises the variance of the errors, the estimated coefficients in the wage equation drop in 
magnitude.  This happens even when distance is not correlated with any other measure.  
Comparison 3 uses the reference parameter values (β 1, β 2, and β 3 equal 0.5, 0.5 and 1.0, 
respectively).  If β 4 equals zero, the mean estimates of γ 1, γ 2 and γ 3 are –0.22, -0.23 and 0.74.  
When β 4 equals -0.5, the mean estimates change to –0.21, -0.22 and 0.72; and when β 4 equals     
–1.0, the mean estimates change to -0.20, -0.21 and 0.69.   When β 4 equals -1.5, the mean 
estimates fall further to –0.19, -0.20 and 0.67.  Increases in σ δ  and σ ω  also decrease the estimates 
in the wage equation (results not shown in Table 4). If β 1 and β 2 equal zero and β 3
 equals 1.0, the 
mean estimate of γ 3 is 0.70 when the standard deviations of the errors equal 1.0.  When the 
standard deviations drop to 0.5, the mean estimate of γ 3 increases to 0.90.  When they increase to 
1.5,  3 γ % drops to 0. 50.  
  35
  Fourth, if candidates prefer closer schools and schools that are closer to more qualified 
candidates systematically differ in their characteristics, then the estimated wage equation will 
misrepresent the value teachers place on these characteristics.  Using the example in which β 1, β 2, 
β 3 and β 4 equal 0.5, 0.5, 1.0, and –1.0 respectively (Comparison 4), if the correlations both 
between qualifications and teacher location and between Z1 and school location are zero then the 
mean estimated coefficient for Z1 is -0.20 (statistically significant in 96 percent of simulations).  
When these correlations equal 0.3,
21 the mean estimated coefficient is -0.21.  When the 
correlations equal 0.6, the mean estimate is -0.261, one-third larger in magnitude compared to 
the case where there is no such spatial proximity. 
Finally, while the quality equation more accurately reflects the underlying preferences 
than the wage equation in some instances, it is also subject to potential biases.  For example, the 
increasing correlation between Z1 and salary has little effect on the predicted relationship 
between salary and quality in the quality equation, while it reduces the estimated relationship 
substantially in the wage equation (Comparison 2).  Furthermore, in Comparisons 1 and 2 the 
tests of statistical significance for the quality equation yield results that more accurately reflect 
the underlying parameter values, more so than the tests of statistical significance for the wage 
equation. On the other hand, increased error such as that resulting from the importance of 
distance has an approximately equal effect on the estimated relationship in the salary and quality 
equation estimates (Comparisons 3).  The same is true for increasing the geographical proximity 
of more qualified teachers and schools having higher values of Z1  (Comparison 4).      
In summary, the simulations suggest that the standard wage model approach for 
estimating compensating differentials is seriously flawed.  These simulations, the theoretical 
                                                 
21 As these correlations increase, teachers having greater qualifications, on average, live increasingly close to 
schools having higher values of Z1.  
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considerations discussed in section III, and the stark differences in the empirical results described 
above together cause us to conclude that the matching model employed here provides a 
preferable framework for analyzing teacher labor markets. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Our descriptive analyses of teacher labor markets point to a high degree of systematic 
sorting of teachers across schools.  Yet, hedonic wage models have not produced consistent 
estimates for understanding this sorting.  In this paper we have used a method of simulated 
moments estimate of the two-sided matching model.  The results suggest that this may be a 
useful estimation strategy to explore further.  Unlike the hedonic models, our empirical matching 
model produces estimates in keeping with the hypotheses that schools prefer high ability teachers 
and teachers prefer both higher wages and schools with fewer poor or minority students.  Our 
findings of the relative importance of school proximity and the interaction of geographical 
proximity and school racial composition is relevant to policy.  The negative estimate of the effect 
of minority students on the utility of both minority and non-minority teachers once distance is 
accounted for in the model suggests that the proportion of minority students in a school may be 
proxying for other characteristics of the school.  In future work we hope to include alternative 
distance measures (e.g., distance from college and distance for home measured in terms of where 
individuals attended high school) as well as an indicator of whether a school is in the district 
where one attended high school.  Other important extensions will be to analyze the effects of 
potential policy levers, such as class size, teacher preparation time, school facilities, and other 
non-instructional resources and gain access to the needed additional computational power needed 
to analyze the New York City metropolitan area.    
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The model may also be expanded to address questions of who becomes a teacher and 
who quits or transfers.  The framework allows us to include potential teachers in the matching 
process and not just those who took teaching jobs.  Similarly, instead of assuming that the only 
openings are for new teachers in the jobs that new teachers fill, we can allow for vacancy chains.  
That is, when an opening becomes available because a teacher leaves the system or because the 
number of teachers in a school increases, we can allow current teachers to move into those spots, 
creating vacancies in their old schools.    
Even though this paper focuses on worker-job match within the context of teacher labor 
markets, the issues raised and the empirical framework employed are relevant in other settings 
where wages are set administratively or, more generally, do not clear the pertinent markets for 
job and worker attributes.  The theoretical points made in section III, the simulations in section 
VI and the differences between the estimates for the hedonic and two-sided matching models 
bring into question the common practice of employing hedonic models to estimate compensating 
differentials in such settings.  Even though there is little reason to think that the wage locus in 
such cases will reflect marginal evaluations on either side of the market, the need to estimate 
compensating differentials and empirically analyze the functioning of such markets remains.  
The empirical framework and estimation strategy developed in this paper, thus, may prove useful 
in a range of other applications.    
In summary, his paper is a step toward understanding the functioning of teacher labor 
markets and the factors that influence teachers’ decisions about whether and where to teach and 
schools’ decisions about which teachers to hire. The matching model shows promise for 
estimating compensating differentials and the preferences of both employers and employees in 
labor markets not characterized by perfect competition and the rapid adjustment of wages.  
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Table 1: The Sample:  5028 First Year K-6 Teachers, 2443 Employers 
 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Variable  Mean  Std Dev 
Qualific. Index  0.00  1.00  Percent Poor, K-6  0.293  0.265 
Salary 32,458  2,607  Urban  0.217   
Percent  Minority  0.210  0.293  Distance to Job (miles)  24.61  115.27 
Minority Teacher  0.064    Distance if < 100 miles  10.29  13.18 
          
Year          
      1995  0.109          1998  0.139   
      1996  0.123          1999  0.211   
      1997  0.151          2000  0.267   
MSAs/Regions         
      Albany  0.178         Syracuse  0.167   
      Buffalo  0.251         Utica-Rome  0.055   
      Rochester  0.350         
Note:  Salaries are for 2000.  If the 2000 salaries were not available due to districts operating out of contract, we 
used salary information for the most recent prior year and inflated the value using the average percent change 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Personnel data  Certification and 
exam data 
SUNY student data  School and district data 
UNIVERSE:  All public school 
teachers, 
superintendents, 
principals, and other staff 
All individuals taking 
certification exams 
All SUNY applicants 
(including non-teachers) 
All public schools and 
districts 
ELEMENTS:  - salary 
- course subject and  
        grade 
- class size 
- experience (district  
        and other) 
- years of education and  
        degree attainment 
- age 
- gender 
- scores on NTE and 
    NYSTCE (general  
    knowledge,  
    pedagogy, and  
    content specialty)  
    exams 
- college of  
     undergraduate and 
     graduate degrees  
- degrees earned 
- zip code of residence 




- high school attended 
- high school courses 
- high school GPA 
- SAT exam scores 
- college attended and  
     dates 
- intended college  
     major 
- actual college major 
- college GPA 





- enrollment  
- student poverty (free 
     and reduced lunch  
     counts) 
- enrollment by race 
- limited English 
       proficiency 
- student test results 
- dropout rates 
- district wealth 
- district salary schedule 
- support staff and aides 
TIME PERIOD: 
 
1969-70 to 1999-00  1984-85 to 1999-00  1989-90 to 1999-00  1969-70 to 1999-00 
SOURCE:  New York State 
Education Department 
New York State 
Education Department 
The State University of 
New York 






As noted in Section V, it is necessary to use simulation to compute values of  () ; mtk mtk Eq z θ  in 
the moment condition  () [] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk mtk z q E q z n 0 ; | θ  and  () ; mtk mtk Ed z θ   in the moment 
conditions  () [ ] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk mtk z d E d z n 0 ; | θ  and  () [ ] ∑∑ = −
tk
mtk mtk mtk mtk z d E d n 0 ; | θ  .  Let 
() θ ; | mtk mtk z q F  be the approximation of  () θ ; | mtk mtk z q E  obtained through simulation; and 
() θ ; | mtk mtk z d F , the simulator for  () θ ; | mtk mtk z d E .  
  Our method for calculating the simulated moments is as follows. (1) A standard-normal random 
number generator generates H sets of independent draws for the random variables in the model.  In 
each draw, random numbers are generated corresponding to the random variable in each candidate’s 
benefit equation for every school alternative.  We denote these values in the h
th draw using the notation 
h
jk δ , j = 1,2,…,J and k = 1,2,…,K.  Similarly the h
th draw includes randomly generated values for the 
random error terms (
h
jk ω ) in the equations characterizing the benefits to each employer associated with 
hiring each candidate.  These randomly generated values are held constant throughout the estimation, 
as are the observed attributes of candidates and schools.  (2)  For a given set of parameter values 
() () β α θ , =  the simulated moments are obtained as follows.  The values of 
h
jk δ  and 
h
jk ω for a particular 
draw (h) are used to infer the rankings of candidates and jobs discussed above.  In turn, these rankings 
are used with the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm to determine the school-optimal stable matching 


















mtk d d 1 are computed for each of the K schools hiring in the h
th simulation of the outcome  
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in market m during period t.   h
mtk S  is the set of teachers in school k in draw h.  Repeating this step for 
each of the draws yields the following approximations of the pertinent expected values.     




mtk H mtk mtk z q E q z q F ≈ ∑ =  




mtk H mtk mtk z d E d z d F ≈ ∑ =  
We substitute these expressions into the above moment conditions to get the simulated moment 
conditions summarized by Equations 1 and 2: 
() [] θ ψ ; | mtk mtk mtk mtk
a
mtk z q F q z − ≡  
        () [] θ ψ ; | mtk mtk mtk mtk
b
mtk z d F d z − ≡        (1)  
    () [] θ ψ ; | mtk mtk mtk
c
mtk z d F d − ≡  













 == = 
 
∑∑ ∑∑    (2) 
 Defining  () θ ψ  to be a column vector containing the stacked values of  1 ψ ,  2 ψ , … ,  5 ψ  for the five 
markets,  the method of simulated moment (MSM) estimator is defined by: 
() ) ( ) ( min arg ˆ θ ψ θ ψ θ
θ
W W ′ = . 
where W is a symmetric, positive semidefinite weighting matrix. In general, the optimal weighting 
matrix is  1 − Ω = W  where  [] ψ Var Asy = Ω .  Given our framework, Ω  simplifies to the following 
block diagonal matrix where the m






~ 1 θ ψ θ ψ ∑∑ ′ = Ω
tk
mtk mtk n m
m
 evaluated at some consistent estimate of θ , θ
~






























































E   
Thus, the efficient MSM estimator in our case will be  () ∑
− Ω ′ = Ω
m
m m m ) (
~
) ( min arg
~ ˆ 1 θ ψ θ ψ θ
θ
. 
In the empirical analysis below, we obtain the consistent, but inefficient, estimate of θ , 
() ∑ ′ =
m
m m I ) ( ) ( min arg
~
θ ψ θ ψ θ
θ
 for the case of an identity weighting matrix, I.  In later work, these 
estimates will be used to compute the  m Ω
~
 used to obtain the second-stage estimates  () Ω
~ ˆ θ . However, the 
first-stage estimates are of interest in themselves, since they are consistent estimates of the parameters of 
interest and can give us a sense of the fruitfulness of the estimation strategy. 
The asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimator θ
~
 is   () [] []
























 and approximate the block diagonal elements of Ω  using the formula for 
m Ω
~
 shown above to obtain the standard errors of the first-stage parameter estimates. 
We use 25 draws of the random errors to calculate the simulators and a combination of grid 
search and derivative techniques to estimate the parameters.  We then use 250 draws of the random 
errors in the simulations used to calculate the derivatives of the moments needed to compute the 
standard errors of the point estimates. 
 